

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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DATE ACQUIRED This is UNEVALUATED Information

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. Soviet strategy for the Summit Conference has been very carefully planned. Having completed their preparatory moves, such as the Austrian Treaty, the Warsaw Pact, and the modus vivendi with Tito, the Soviets are now apparently inclined to assume a wait-and-see attitude. They will allow the Americans to come forward at the conference with recommendations and proposals and will try to maneuver the United States into the role of obstructing the unification of Germany and of sabotaging world peace.
2. Germany, according to the Soviet plan, would be a federation of East and West Germany, with a neutralized Berlin as the seat of the government. The Soviets hope for direct negotiations with Germany, during which they reportedly are prepared to make the following concessions: modification of the Oder-Neisse line at the expense of Poland; indemnification of the Sudeten expellees at the expense of Czechoslovakia; agreement to the creation of a German army, provided that Germany severs its NATO ties; and economic expansion of Germany to the east. Agreement with Germany, with any Germany, even a right-wing one, continues to be the desire of the "technocrat clique" in Moscow. The Soviets are hopeful of finding suitable partners for such agreement in West Germany.
3. If the Soviets are unable to block the discussion of the problem of the Satellite countries at Geneva, they intend to counter by declaring that the Satellites can attain the same degree of independence within the Soviet orbit as has been achieved by Titoist Yugoslavia.¹ this would be a fictitious independence, for the Soviets are certainly not prepared to permit the neutralization of the Satellites in return for the neutralization of Germany. Still less will they be prepared to permit free elections or a change of regime in any Satellite.
4. The Soviets are confident that politically they are better prepared for the conference than is the West. They believe that the West lacks unity of opinion and trust that Britain, and especially France, will not support the United States if the latter were to come forward with any radical suggestions. Above all, the Soviets believe that France would not stick out its neck if the Soviets were to promise that they would no longer support the anti-French elements in North Africa.

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5. In order to convince the Western peoples of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions, the Soviets intend to exploit the following offers, which would be cheap concessions for them:

- a. Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in return for the dissolution of NATO;
- b. Withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany and, conceivably, even from some or all of the Satellites in return for the withdrawal of American troops from Europe;
- c. Disbanding of the Cominform, if necessary, since it really no longer exists as such.

1. Comment: This sentence is given as received.

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